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Like other quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, the basic principles of the decoy-state
protocol detecting the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack are also quantum mechanics and sta-
tistical hypothesis testing. The error probability can be computed in the original BB84 protocol,
while the existing decoy-state protocols just reserve the mean of the test statistic and lose the
distribution information, which results in failure of calculating the error probability (i.e., the sig-
nificance level). In fact, if the error probability of a method detecting attacks cannot be calculated
accurately, this method cannot be employed in the real cryptographic systems. In this paper, we
find the missing information of the existing decoy-state protocols, extract a Cauchy distribution
statistic, and further provide the corresponding detection method and the error probability. Thus,
only our method can be applied to the practical cryptographic systems. Furthermore, the associated
experiments we performed (i.e., the significance level is 5%) show the correctness of our method.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–7] is a tech-
nique that allows two different remote parties, Alice (the
sender) and Bob (the receiver), to share a unconditional
secret key. The unconditional security of the key is guar-
anteed through the laws of quantum mechanics [8–12].
The first ideal QKD protocol was BB84-QKD protocol
created by Bennett and Brassard [1], which needs to
employ the perfect single-photon source. Nevertheless,
at present, single-photon sources are not available, so a
weak coherent photon source is often utilized to replace
the single-photon source. Due to adopting the imperfect
single-photon sources, an eavesdropper Eve can launch
the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [13–18].
There are numerous protocols proposed to resist the
PNS attack, among which the decoy-state method is a
highly effective one. The existing decoy-state protocols,
such as [19–21], presented a method to detect the PNS
attack. This method is based on the sample data to infer
whether there is a aggressive behavior, and is a typical
statistical hypothesis testing method. The ideal BB84
protocol can cauclate the error probability of detecting
the PNS attack, since the distribution of the statistic
needed is known. The existing decoy-state protocols,
when introducing decoy states to detect PNS attacks,
only retain the mean value of the statistic in the deduc-
tion process from sample data to discriminant criteria,
and lose the complete distribution information, which re-
sults in failure to calculate the error probability (i.e., the
significance level). Actually, if a statistical hypothesis
testing method cannot calculate the error probability, it
also cannot be used in the real cryptographic systems.
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In other words, the existing decoy-state protocols cannot
be employed in the practical applications of QKD.
In this work, under the null hypothesis of no PNS
attack Ho1, we retrieve the lost information, extract a
Cauchy distribution statistic and provide a new method
to detect the PNS attack, namely the first test in this
paper. Most importantly, the error probability of our
method can be calculated and we also give the calcula-
tions. Because of this, compared with the existing decoy-
state protocols, only our method can be used in practical
cryptographic systems. Furthermore, given the signifi-
cance level of the first test α1 and the number of the first
test m, we interpret the empirical results to verify the
correctness of the first test through the NIST Statistical
Test Suite, which is called the second test in this paper.
And the end, the associated experiments we performed
also indicate that our method is credible (i.e., the signif-
icance level is 5%).
The structure of this paper is organized as follows. In
Sec. II, we provide a brief review of PNS attack and
decoy-state method. In Sec. III, we propose a new detec-
tion method of PNS attack for decoy-state QKD. The
corresponding experiments we performed and analysis
are shown in Sec. IV. Finally, we summarize our method
and discuss future work in Sec. V.
II. REVIEW OF PNS ATTACK AND
DECOY-STATE METHOD
A. PNS attack
In the security proof of BB84-QKD protocol [2], one
significant assumption is that Alice adopts a perfect
single-photon source. Due to the limitation of the tech-
nology, it is extremely hard to obtain pure single-photon
sources. In practice, a weak coherent photon source is
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usually regarded as a displacement. The photon number
of the weak coherent photon source obeys the Poisson dis-
tribution with a mean that the intensity of the photon
source, among which the multiphoton pulses cannot be
neglected. As for the multiphoton pulses, an eavesdrop-
per Eve can start the photon-number-splitting (PNS) at-
tack [13–18].
The fundamental idea of the PNS attack is the follow-
ing. In the PNS attack, Eve intercepts all pulses emitted
from Alice and gets the photon number of each pulse by
utilizing the quantum nondemolition measurement [22–
24]. As to the single-photon pulses, Eve blocks them and
does not send them to Bob. With regard to the multi-
photon pulses, Eve perserves one photon which will be
saved in the quantum memory, and sends the remain-
ing photons to Bob through a low loss or even lossless
channel. After Bob announces the measurement bases,
Eve measures the photons stored in the quantum mem-
ory with the same bases as Bob. In this way, Eve can
get the same keys as Bob. On the one hand, as to all in-
tercepted pulses, quantum nondemolition measurement
about the photon number performed by Eve does not
disturb their quantum states. Hence, no additional error
will be introduced. On the other hand, Eve can adjust
the transmission rate of each kind of pulses to keep the
photon-number distribution of the weak coherent photon
source (at Bob’s side) same as the case of no eavesdrop-
ping. Based on the aforementioned analysis, Eve can
avoid being founded. Under the condition of larger chan-
nel loss and lower detection efficiency (at Bob’s side), this
attack will become more powerful.
B. Decoy-state method
The pioneer work of the decoy-state method was ini-
tiated by Hwang [19]. Based on Hwang’s method [19],
Wang [20] and H.K. Lo et al. [21] independently proposed
the decoy-state QKD protocols to solve the problem of
PNS attack. In the decoy-state QKD protocol, Alice in-
tentionally and randomly chooses several weak coherent
photon sources with different intensities, among which
one is the signal source for distributing keys and others
are decoy sources. Note that the weak coherent photon
sources with different intensities have different photon-
number distributions.
The basic idea of the decoy-state method is the fol-
lowing. Theoretically, Eve cannot distinguish the pulses
intercepted from which kind of weak coherent photon
source. Furthermore, she cannot ensure that the photon-
number distributions of different photon sources consis-
tent with the case of no eavesdropping, if she can only
adjust the transmission rate of each kind of pulses. Thus,
by mixing the decoy state into the signal state, Alice and
Bob can easily find Eve’s eavesdropping, according to the
abnormality of the statistical results of each kind of weak
coherent photon source.
III. THE SCHEME
In this section, we will focus on our scheme to defeat
the PNS attack. For one thing, we describe the first test,
a new detection method of PNS attack for decoy-state
QKD, which can precisely calculate the error probabil-
ity of detection. For another, we interpret the empirical
results to verify the correctness of the first test, namely,
the second test in this paper.
A. The first test
In this part, we introduce the new method to detect the
PNS attack in decoy-state QKD via statistical hypoth-
esis testing, which is called the first test in this paper.
Then we analyse the type I error of the first test, that is,
mistaking no PNS attack for having a PNS attack. The
first test contains five steps.
a. Identify null and alternative hypothesis Let us
consider the hypothesis testing problem about the null
hypothesis Ho1: there is no PNS attack on the channel
and the alternative hypothesis Ha1: there is a PNS at-
tack on the channel.
b. Construct the test statistic We need a test statis-
tic to conduct the hypothesis testing. In what follows, the
distribution of the test statistic is derived under the null
hypothesis Ho1. Alice intentionally and randomly selects
two weak coherent photon sources with different inten-
sities, namely, signal source and decoy source. Suppose
the intensities of the signal source and the decoy source
are µ and ν, respectively. Pn(µ) denotes the probabil-






The yield yn represents the probability of receiving a
pulse (at Bob’s side) after Alice emits a n-photons pulse.
According to Ref. [21], one has yn ≈ nη where η is the
overall transmission probability of each photon. The gain
Q is the probability of receiving a pulse (at Bob’s side)
after Alice emits a pulse, no matter how many photons



















Let us consider further about the sending and receiving
process between Alice and Bob. When Alice emits a pulse
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from the signal source, the outcome (at Bob’s side) only
includes two cases, that is, receiving it or not. Therefore,
the sending and receiving process can be regarded as a
Bernoulli trial. Taking advantage of Eq. (2), we derive
the probability that Bob receives the signal pulse p1 =
µη. Suppose the number of signal pulses Alice emits
and that of signal pulses Bob receives are N1 and n1,
respectively. Next, n1 has the binomial distribution with
parameters (N1, p1), for short,
n1 ∼ B(N1, p1). (3)
In Ref. [20], we find N1 is so large (typically 10
9 ∼
1010), µ and η are approximately 10−2 ∼ 10−1 and
10−4 ∼ 10−3, respectively. Thus, p1 is roughly 10−6 ∼
10−4. By the law of large numbers and the central limit
theorem, when N1p1 ≥ 5 and N1p1(1 − p1) ≥ 5, the
binomial distribution with parameters (N1, p1) can be
approximately regarded as the normal distribution with
mean N1p1 and variance N1p1(1− p1), given by
n1 ∼ N(N1p1, N1p1(1− p1)). (4)
Moreover, p1 ≪ 1 yields that
n1 ∼ N(N1p1, N1p1). (5)
After standardization, we have a random variable X1




∼ N(0, 1). (6)
Since the only difference between the signal source and
the decoy source is their intensities, it is easy to get the




∼ N(0, 1), (7)
where N2 and n2 are the number of the decoy pulses
Alice emits and that of the decoy pulses Bob receives,
respectively. p2 represents the probability of receiving
a decoy pulse (at Bob’s side) after Alice emits a decoy
pulse, no matter how many photons which contains and
the value of p2 is νη. According to the definition of t
distribution, let the random variable Y = X1/X2, then
Y obeys the t distribution with a single degree of freedom,








∼ C(1, 0), (8)
where C represents the Cauchy distribution, the scale
parameter is 1 and the location parameter is 0. Moreover,







dt, −∞ < y < ∞, (9)
where y is the value of Y and is also the test statistic
that we find.
c. Find the value of the test statistic Set the param-
eters µ, ν, N1, N2, η, then record n1 and n2. Substitut-
ing these data into Eq. (8), the desired value of the test
statistic y can be obtained.
d. Choose a significance level We need to determine
a significance level (typically 0.05) for the first test. In
terms of the null hypothesis of the first test Ho1, we de-
duce that the first test is a two-tailed hypothesis testing.
In addition, given the significance level of the first test




can be obtained by Eq. (9).
e. Make a decision Compare the test statistic y




. If y > y1−α1
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or y < −y1−α1
2
, we will reject Ho1 and accept Ha1. This
means that we believe there is a PNS attack on the chan-
nel. Otherwise, we fail to reject Ho1. That is to say, we
consider there is no PNS attack on the channel. Remark
the significance level of the first test α1 is also the type
I error probability of the first test, namely, the probabil-
ity of mistaking no PNS attack for having a PNS attack.
Let β denote the type II error probability of the first
test, to be precise, the probability of mistaking having a
PNS attack for no PNS attack. Under the condition of
fixed sample size, if α1 decreases, β will increase and vice
versa. In other words, one cannot make both α1 and β
smaller at the same time. Note that β is difficult to find
in most situations. In this paper, we intend to achieve
a reasonable balance between the two types of errors by
controlling α1.
B. The second test
In this part, given the significance level of the first
test α1 and the number of the first test m, we account
for the empirical results to check the correctness of the
first test via the NIST Statistical Test Suite, according
to illustrating the reasonability of the counting rate of
accepting Ho1, which is called the second test in this
paper. The second test also contains five steps.
a. Identify null and alternative hypothesis Under
the significance level of the first test α1 and the number
of the first test m, let us consider the hypothesis test-
ing problem about the null hypothesis Ho2: the counting
rate of accepting Ho1 with the first test is reasonable
and the alternative hypothesis Ha2: the counting rate of
accepting Ho1 with the first test is unreasonable.
b. Construct the test statistic Supposing that each
first test is independent and identically distributed, the
confidence level of the first test is q = 1−α1. Let us con-
sider further about the first test. The results contain two
cases, namely, accepting Ho1 or rejecting Ho1. Thereby,
one can regard each first test as a Bernoulli trial. Note
that the probability of accepting Ho1 is q. Suppose the
number of the first test and that of accepting Ho1 are
m and ξ, respectively. Then, ξ will obey the binomial
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distribution with parameters (m, q), for short,
ξ ∼ B(m, q). (10)
When mq ≥ 5 and mq(1 − q) ≥ 5, by the law of large
numbers and the central limit theorem, the binomial dis-
tribution with parameters (m, q) can be approximatively
regarded as the normal distribution with mean mq and
variance mq(1 − q), written as
ξ ∼ N(mq,mq(1− q)). (11)
After standardization, we get a random variable Z which





∼ N(0, 1). (12)











2 dt, −∞ < z < ∞ (13)
where z is the value of Z and is just the test statistic that
we find.
c. Find the value of the test statistic Select m and
record ξ. Substituting these data into Eq. (12), one can
get the value of the test statistic z.
d. Choose a significance level We need to choose a
significance level α2 (typically, α1 = α2) for the second
test. According to the null hypothesis of the second test
Ho2, we deduce that the second test is a two-tailed hy-





can be obtained by Eq. (13).
e. Make a decision Compare the test statistic z with









, we will reject Ho2 and accept Ha2. In other
words, we consider the counting rate of accepting Ho1
is unreasonable. Otherwise, we fail to reject Ho2. This
means that we believe the counting rate of accepting Ho1
is reasonable, and verifies the correctness of the first test
at the same time.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
In the preceding section, we show the details of our
detection method. Now, we move forward to the cor-
responding experiments based on the aforementioned
method and analyse the experimental results.
A. The first test
The experimental parameters and their corresponding
values of the first test are listed in Table I. After calcu-
lation, we obtain the value of the test statistic y = 4.90.
























FIG. 1. The schematic diagram of the first test. The value of
the test statistic y is 4.90. Given the significance level of the








critical values are y1−α1
2
= 12.71 and −y1−α1
2
= −12.71.
Due to −12.71 < 4.90 < 12.71, the test statistic does
not fall inside the rejection region and we fail to reject
Ho1. In other words, we infer that there is no PNS attack
on the channel and the probability of being wrong is no
more than 5%. The schematic diagram of the first test
is illustrated in Fig. 1.
B. The second test
In this part, we interpret the empirical results to check
the correctness of the first test via the NIST Statistical
Test Suite. The number of the first test and that of ac-
cepting Ho1 are m = 984 and ξ = 945, respectively. The
experimental parameters and their corresponding values
of the second test are listed in Table II. In practical QKD
systems, one cannot accurately control the number of sig-
nal pulses Alice emits N1 and that of decoy pulses Alice
emits N2. Fortunately, although the values ofN1 for each
first test are not completely identical, they are very close
and have the same order of magnitude. For simplicity,
we ignore the effect of the minimal deviation of different
N1 and take the same stratety to N2.
TABLE I. Experimental parameters and their corresponding
values of the first test.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
µ 0.4 n1 545, 761
ν 0.1 n2 22, 715
η 10−3 α1 0.05












N2 701, 967, 239 y 4.90
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TABLE II. Experimental parameters and their corresponding
values of the second test.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
µ 0.4 η 10−3
ν 0.1 m 984
N1 4.212 × 10
9 ξ 945
N2 7.020 × 10
8 α2 0.05



































FIG. 2. The schematic diagram of the second test. The value
of the test statistic z is 1.49. Given the significance level of








After calculation, we obtain the value of the test statis-
tic z = 1.49. Given the significance level of the second





= −1.96. Since −1.96 < 1.49 < 1.96, the test
statistic does not fall inside the rejection region and we
fail to reject Ho2. This means that the counting rate of
accepting Ho1 is reasonable, and also further affirms the
correctness of our method. The schematic diagram of the
second test is illustrated in Fig. 2.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, we recover the lost information of the
existing decoy-state protocols when detecting the PNS
attack, and extract out a Cauchy distribution statistic.
Based on this information, we propose a new detection
method including the first test and the second test. Most
importantly, the error probability of detection can be pre-
cisely calculated in our method and we also give the cal-
culations. Compared with the existing decoy-state proto-
cols, only our method can be applied to practical crypto-
graphic systems since other protocols cannnot calculate
the corresponding error probability of detection. Mean-
while, the associated experiments we performed also ver-
ify the correctness of our scheme.
As for future work, one direction is to research the
influences of different variables to the experimental re-
sults, such as the intensity of the weak coherent photon
source and the overall transmission probability of each
photon. The other direction is to analyse the type II er-
ror of the first test, that is to say, mistaking having a PNS
attack for no PNS attack, when the type of the PNS at-
tack is determined. In addition, we can further consider
about other decoy-state QKD protocols which cannot
accurately calculate the error probability of detection.
Therefore, another direction is to extend our method to
other decoy-state QKD protocols, such as three different
intensities of coherent photon source [25–27] and four dif-
ferent intensities of coherent photon source [28], and one
can try to figure out the error probability of detection for
these decoy-state protocols.
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